Would opaque systematic patronage result in polarization and/or cynicism or is it the opposite because such a way of doing business results in effective government (eg Tammany Hall in the 19th century)?
When I started Rauch’s very long, dense paper, I couldn’t help be feel obligated to automatically disagree with the author. There is no way corruption and opacity can be a good thing, and it definitely cannot make the government more efficient. However, according to the author, “the right amount of corruption is greater than zero, because a zero-tolerance approach criminalizes politics without actually ending corruption” (Rauch 7). I have always thought that participation yielded progress, but Jonathan Rauch has me pretty convinced that this is not necessarily the case. In his essay, Political realism: How hacks, machines, big money, and back-room deals can strengthen American democracy, he proposes a seemingly ridiculous idea about reinstating political machines in order for the government to be more effective.
The example that Rauch refers to is Tammany Hall: the machine that took over New York politics in the 19th century. Rauch suggests, throughout his essay, that’s it’s very important to have these opaque systems in order to see visible and tangible change (which seems counterintuitive). This was a little bit hard to swallow at first because he was basically saying corruption is essential. Like many of us, Rauch is worried that increased dislike for professional politics will make is disappear. Then he throws this crazy idea into the mix: What if they don’t know? On the second page his does clarify some of the concerns we, the readers, have. He includes a disclaimer saying that we shouldn’t go back to Tammany Hall, but the machine should be reformed to allow transactional politics to take place. I do agree with this because sometimes it’s really difficult to communicate such complex and boring aspects of politics to the general public. This is when things got very interesting; Rauch dove into the difference between an amateur and a professional politician.
I hadn’t even considered the distinction until he brought it up. The first question I had was: What does it mean to be an amateur? The consensus that we came to was that professional politicians are skilled in their field and understand how the system works (and also how to work the system). Amateurs are far more ideological and are less experienced. That being said, amateurs tend to more charismatic, so that is what helps them win the election. A great example we brought up was the difference between someone like Hillary Clinton (a very skilled career politician) and Donald Trump (an over-the-top amateur). What makes amateurs so attractive is their strong beliefs and their ability to relate to other people with extreme views; Amateurs are fueled by ideologies and passion. He also says that amateurs are the one responsible for the convoluted image of machines because the make governing harder (Rauch 6).Unfortunately career politicians sometimes lack the strong charisma and ideological views that are necessary to get them elected. In class, we talked about how in order to get elected, you have to have a balanced ticket. This means the ticket must be comprised of both an amateur and a career politician. Obama did this successfully by allowing himself to be the charismatic amateur and Biden to be the professional.
Now in order to let these career professionals to do what they do best, there needs to be a system in place that allows them to do so. The main argument in this essay is to say that the way to do it is with machines. On page 9, Rauch talks about what a machine needs to be. What I found most thought-provoking was his idea of an internal hierarchy without centralization. He has an idea that accountability will encourage productivity, and work can get done if people know their place. Machines also force people to compromise “because they have to” (Rauch 11). He then says that “moderation comes from machines that force politicians toward compromise” (Rauch 11). At first I disagreed with this statement, but then I realized there is a lot of truth in what he’s saying. Extremists are often elected because their ideas are ideological, interesting, and attention-grabbing. Because they’re so ingrained in their own beliefs, compromise is almost impossible. When people can’t compromise, they spend time debating until one side gets what they want. In that respect, I do agree with Rauch because moderation will happen if people are forced to compromise. I’m not sure if machines will make people compromise, but Rauch tells us that incentives can get the job done.
I think cynicism is a result of stagnation, so if people are seeing change, will they continue to be cynical? Based on Rauch’s evidence, I don’t think machines yield cynicism. Instead my concern with this is that it will make the government more elitist. Rauch suggests incentivising people with political credit or some sort of reciprocity. The only people that can get political credit or reciprocity, are those who can afford to do so. Unfortunately this is a very small percentage of people, so a lot of the issues that need to be dealt with will not be taken care of because of finances. Rauch references Williamson and quotes him saying, “[the machine] could plausibly not be seen as a violation of democracy, but as a brilliant exercise of leadership so as to advance the interests of the poor as well as the public interest writ large” (Rauch 12). I’m not entirely sure how the interests of the poor can be represented if no one is representing them…
Another important issue is fundraising. Rauch claims that “In states where parties do more of the fundraising and spending, the legislatures are less polarized and the parties’ own behavior is more moderate” (Rauch 26). He suggests that there needs to be more of a following for the existing bipartisan groups. Again, this sounds counterintuitive. The question is how to “strike a less lopsided balance” (Rauch 26).
Overall, machines seem like the lesser of two evils (based on Rauch’s thesis) because they are the facilitators. Corruption is bound to exist, so if it is regulated then it can actually accomplish something. If transactional politics is occurring, then cynicism will be reduced because there are tangible changes being made. If politicians are forced to compromise then this might end up with more moderate policies. However, extreme ideologies are essential to create drastic change.
When I started Rauch’s very long, dense paper, I couldn’t help be feel obligated to automatically disagree with the author. There is no way corruption and opacity can be a good thing, and it definitely cannot make the government more efficient. However, according to the author, “the right amount of corruption is greater than zero, because a zero-tolerance approach criminalizes politics without actually ending corruption” (Rauch 7). I have always thought that participation yielded progress, but Jonathan Rauch has me pretty convinced that this is not necessarily the case. In his essay, Political realism: How hacks, machines, big money, and back-room deals can strengthen American democracy, he proposes a seemingly ridiculous idea about reinstating political machines in order for the government to be more effective.
The example that Rauch refers to is Tammany Hall: the machine that took over New York politics in the 19th century. Rauch suggests, throughout his essay, that’s it’s very important to have these opaque systems in order to see visible and tangible change (which seems counterintuitive). This was a little bit hard to swallow at first because he was basically saying corruption is essential. Like many of us, Rauch is worried that increased dislike for professional politics will make is disappear. Then he throws this crazy idea into the mix: What if they don’t know? On the second page his does clarify some of the concerns we, the readers, have. He includes a disclaimer saying that we shouldn’t go back to Tammany Hall, but the machine should be reformed to allow transactional politics to take place. I do agree with this because sometimes it’s really difficult to communicate such complex and boring aspects of politics to the general public. This is when things got very interesting; Rauch dove into the difference between an amateur and a professional politician.
I hadn’t even considered the distinction until he brought it up. The first question I had was: What does it mean to be an amateur? The consensus that we came to was that professional politicians are skilled in their field and understand how the system works (and also how to work the system). Amateurs are far more ideological and are less experienced. That being said, amateurs tend to more charismatic, so that is what helps them win the election. A great example we brought up was the difference between someone like Hillary Clinton (a very skilled career politician) and Donald Trump (an over-the-top amateur). What makes amateurs so attractive is their strong beliefs and their ability to relate to other people with extreme views; Amateurs are fueled by ideologies and passion. He also says that amateurs are the one responsible for the convoluted image of machines because the make governing harder (Rauch 6).Unfortunately career politicians sometimes lack the strong charisma and ideological views that are necessary to get them elected. In class, we talked about how in order to get elected, you have to have a balanced ticket. This means the ticket must be comprised of both an amateur and a career politician. Obama did this successfully by allowing himself to be the charismatic amateur and Biden to be the professional.
Now in order to let these career professionals to do what they do best, there needs to be a system in place that allows them to do so. The main argument in this essay is to say that the way to do it is with machines. On page 9, Rauch talks about what a machine needs to be. What I found most thought-provoking was his idea of an internal hierarchy without centralization. He has an idea that accountability will encourage productivity, and work can get done if people know their place. Machines also force people to compromise “because they have to” (Rauch 11). He then says that “moderation comes from machines that force politicians toward compromise” (Rauch 11). At first I disagreed with this statement, but then I realized there is a lot of truth in what he’s saying. Extremists are often elected because their ideas are ideological, interesting, and attention-grabbing. Because they’re so ingrained in their own beliefs, compromise is almost impossible. When people can’t compromise, they spend time debating until one side gets what they want. In that respect, I do agree with Rauch because moderation will happen if people are forced to compromise. I’m not sure if machines will make people compromise, but Rauch tells us that incentives can get the job done.
I think cynicism is a result of stagnation, so if people are seeing change, will they continue to be cynical? Based on Rauch’s evidence, I don’t think machines yield cynicism. Instead my concern with this is that it will make the government more elitist. Rauch suggests incentivising people with political credit or some sort of reciprocity. The only people that can get political credit or reciprocity, are those who can afford to do so. Unfortunately this is a very small percentage of people, so a lot of the issues that need to be dealt with will not be taken care of because of finances. Rauch references Williamson and quotes him saying, “[the machine] could plausibly not be seen as a violation of democracy, but as a brilliant exercise of leadership so as to advance the interests of the poor as well as the public interest writ large” (Rauch 12). I’m not entirely sure how the interests of the poor can be represented if no one is representing them…
Another important issue is fundraising. Rauch claims that “In states where parties do more of the fundraising and spending, the legislatures are less polarized and the parties’ own behavior is more moderate” (Rauch 26). He suggests that there needs to be more of a following for the existing bipartisan groups. Again, this sounds counterintuitive. The question is how to “strike a less lopsided balance” (Rauch 26).
Overall, machines seem like the lesser of two evils (based on Rauch’s thesis) because they are the facilitators. Corruption is bound to exist, so if it is regulated then it can actually accomplish something. If transactional politics is occurring, then cynicism will be reduced because there are tangible changes being made. If politicians are forced to compromise then this might end up with more moderate policies. However, extreme ideologies are essential to create drastic change.